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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
VERBERY ADAMS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20090994-CA 
INTRODUCTION 
The prior bad act evidence introduced in this case was inadmissible because the 
State failed to comply with the terms of its Rule 404(b) notice to the defense. 
Specifically, in contradiction of its stated intention to introduce the evidence only "in the 
event that the defendant testifies," the State introduced the evidence during its case-in-
chief. Now, the State claims that the admission of the evidence during its case-in-chief 
was not in error because the trial court's pretrial ruling on admissibility placed no 
condition on when the evidence could be admitted. But the State fails to cite to any rule 
or case law that requires that a condition that it voluntarily sets forth in regard to prior 
bad act evidence be included in a pretrial ruling on admissibility. 
POINT. THE INTRODUCTION OF THE PRIOR BAD ACT EVIDENCE 
IN CONTRADICTION OF THE STATE'S RULE 404(b) NOTICE 
CONSTITUTES PLAIN ERROR REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE 
CONDITION PRECEDENT WAS INCLUDED IN THE PRETRIAL 
RULING ON ADMISSIBILITY 
The State notified the defense of its intent to introduce Rule 404(b) evidence 
conditionally upon Adams testifying. Specifically, the prosecution notified Adams of its 
intent to introduce his fourteen year-old murder conviction only in the event that he 
testified at trial and put his intent at issue. Adams did not testify. In contradiction of its 
stated intention, the prosecution introduced the 404(b) evidence during its case-in-chief, 
effectively rendering the Rule 404(b) notice to the defense inoperable. 
The State now claims that Adams cannot demonstrate error in the admission of the 
evidence because the trial court's pretrial ruling on admissibility placed no condition on 
when the evidence could be admitted. Appellee's Br. at 27-28. But the State fails to cite 
to any rule or case law supporting this assertion. 
It is well-established that "[t]he policy behind the Rule 404(b) notice requirement 
is 'to reduce surprise and promote early resolution on the issue of admissibility.'" United 
States v. Carrasco, 381 F.3d 1237, 1241 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), 
advisory committee note, 1991 amendment.) If the same series of events had taken place 
below with the only difference being that the condition precedent was included in the 
pretrial ruling, Adams would be no less unfairly surprised at the introduction of the prior 
conviction during the State's case-in-chief. Thus, the contention that a condition 
precedent, voluntarily set forth by the State in its Rule 404(b) notice, must be included in 
the pretrial ruling obscures the real issue, the unfair surprise in the State's notice to the 
2 
defense of its intention to introduce Adams' prior conviction only in the event that he 
testifies. Had the condition precedent been explicitly included in the pretrial ruling, the 
defense would be no less surprised at the premature admission of the evidence. 
The State further contends that defense counsel's silence as to the condition 
precedent during pretrial discussion of the Rule 404(b) evidence "waived any claim that 
[Adams'] testimony was a condition precedent to the admission of his prior conviction." 
Appellee's Br. at 29. But defense counsel's silence as to the condition voluntarily set 
forth in the State's Rule 404(b) notice during pretrial argument was not a waiver of that 
condition, but rather represented a reliance on the prosecution's stated intent to introduce 
the evidence only in the event that Adams testified. When the government voluntarily 
conditions the introduction of certain evidence on the testimony of a defendant, defense 
counsel should be entitled to rely on such condition in preparation for trial. Parties 
should be entitled to rely on the language of an opposing counsel's pretrial agreement and 
trust that its author will abide by its stated intentions. This is especially so when the 
notice is mandated by the rule. 
Moreover, if it had been properly complied with, the particular conditional term at 
issue in this case, would have been favorable to the defense. Therefore, defense counsel 
would have no reason to argue against the condition in pretrial discussions on 
admissibility. Because the State's condition was favorable to the defense in that the 
Adams' prior conviction would only come in if he testified, defense counsel had no 
motive to take issue with the condition as set forth in the State's notice during pretrial 
arguments. And, as previously mentioned, defense counsel relied on the language of the 
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State's Rule 404(b) notice and trusted that the State would abide by its stated intention to 
introduce the prior conviction only in the event that Adams testified. Therefore, defense 
counsel's silence as to the condition precedent during pretrial argument did not constitute 
a waiver of that condition. 
The State also takes issue with defense counsel's failure to claim unfair surprise 
when the State introduced Adams' prior conviction during its case-in-chief. Appellee's 
Br. at 30-31. But, after an initial objection to the introduction of the prior conviction 
evidence, defense counsel was precluded from further objection by the trial court. 
Below, during direct examination, when prosecution witness David Greco mentioned 
Adams' prior conviction, the dialogue proceeded as follows: 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Judge, I object to this. I think that the State has 
other methods of introducing this1. This is hearsay. I don't know - 1 don't 
know if there is an exception to it. I don't think 
PROSECUTOR: It's a statement against interest. Your Honor, at this 
point, the State offers State's Exhibit No. 5, which is a certificate of Cook 
County Illinois, People of the State of Illinois vs. Verbery Adams. It's a 
certified statement of conviction/disposition, Case No. 94CR2665101 
where the defendant was convicted murder/intent to kill/injury. 
1
 The State asserts that defense counsel's statement, "[t]he State has other methods of 
introducing this", suggests that defense counsel anticipated that the prior conviction 
would be introduced during the State's case-in-chief. Appellee's Br. at 31. The State 
fails to recognize, however, that another method of introducing Adams' prior conviction 
could be during the State's cross examination of Adams during the presentation of the 
defense's case. 
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COURT: Okay. I'm going to overrule your objection. I've already told 
her that I will allow Exhibit 5. So it will be received. 
R. 85:208-09. But the statement at issue did not qualify as a "statement against interest" 
exception to the hearsay rule because the statement was not hearsay. Had it been 
properly admissible under Rule 404(b), the statement would have been admissible non-
hearsay as an admission by a party-opponent pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(A). 
By failing to rule on the merits of the particular objection and telling defense 
counsel, "I already told her that I will allow Exhibit 5. So it will be received," the trial 
court foreclosed any opportunity for defense counsel to raise additional objections. The 
trial court clearly indicated that its ruling was final and additional objections would not 
be considered. 
Given that defense counsel was precluded from objecting further, Adams' claim of 
unfair surprise is not waived. Minimal standards of fairness dictate that Adams should not 
be prejudiced for defense counsel's failure to object where he had no opportunity to 
object, especially where the State voluntarily set forth the condition precedent in the 
notice and then proceeded to violate that condition. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant/Appellant Verbery Adams respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the conviction and remand this case for a new trial. 
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